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Abstract 
The global call by the World Health Assembly (WHA) to control the rising alcohol-related 
problems caused by harmful consumption through policy became necessary in 2005 due to 
the recognition of the fact that many countries did not have alcohol policies. This gave rise 
to the adoption of a ten-point policy strategy by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
Member States in 2010. Against this backdrop, many countries adopted alcohol policies to 
reduce harmful alcohol consumption. Nigeria was one of the WHO Member Countries that 
adopted the resolution. Nigeria is among the 30 countries with the highest per capita 
consumption and alcohol-related problems, yet has not formulated alcohol policy to date. 
This paper draws on Eisenberg’s Strategic Ambiguity Model to explore the role of brewers in 
supplanting alcohol policy initiatives in Nigeria. It argues that the leading alcohol producers 
in Nigeria have been the main reason alcohol policies have not been formulated. The article 
focuses on why their campaigns for responsible drinking, promotions, sponsorships and 
‘strategic social responsibilities’ may have increased since the WHA made the call and the 
WHO adopted the resolution in 2010. It concludes by arguing that there is an urgent need to 
formulate policies drawing from the WHO resolution to curtail the activities of these 
brewers and reduce harmful consumption.  
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The rising global alcohol consumption and alcohol-related morbidity and mortality 
necessitated the WHA in 2005 to call for effective policies to curb alcohol misuse (WHO, 
2005). The call was directed at the WHO to join hands with member countries to facilitate 
policy implementation channelled towards the reduction of alcohol misuse and related 
problems. The World Health Assembly on 24 May 2008 adopted a resolution that: ‘calls for 
the development by 2010 of a draft global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol 
based on available evidence and existing best practices, and that addresses relevant policy 
options’ (WHO, 2009: 1). In May 2010, the 193 delegates to the Sixty-Third WHA reached an 
agreement to reduce harmful alcohol use (and its related problems) based on the WHA 
2008 draft strategies and subsequently adopted the resolution WHA63.13 (Chick, 2011; 
Poznyak, 2010). The resolution’s main thrusts include inter alia: commitment of leaders to 
the policy, control of marketing and availability of alcohol, pricing policies aimed at reducing 
purchase.  
Prior to this, there had been many programmes formulated by the WHO to either 
reduce or control harmful use of alcohol and drug globally. Between 1979 and 2010, the 
WHA and WHO received eight Reports aimed at either raising awareness or reduction of 
alcohol-related harms.  Following the clarion call by the WHA in 2005, the drafting of 10 
strategies in 2008 and the adoption of the resolution in 2010, many countries have 
responded by adopting policies to reduce harmful use of alcohol globally. Some African 
countries such as South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, Uganda and Kenya have 
responded by drafting policies to regulate alcohol harm in their countries (Parry, 2010; 
Bakke and Endal, 2010; Pitso and Obot, 2011; Obot 2012). South Africa’s policies such as 
National Liquor Bill, the policy that restricted adverts and sales of alcohol, etc. have begun 
to yield results while Botswana recently took further steps by increasing the price of alcohol 
to help control availability (Parry, 2010; Pitso and Obot, 2011). 
Nigeria is a member of the WHO and was one of the 193 delegates that adopted the 
2010 resolution to reduce alcohol-related problems through policies. To date, however, 
Nigeria has eschewed any meaningful action towards formulating and implementing policies 
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despite convincing evidence of the harm excess alcohol consumption adds to the burden of 
disease, injuries and death in Nigeria (WHO, 2004). In fact, the WHO (2009) stated that 
Nigeria consumed 10.57 Litres of alcohol per head of the population and these figures were 
higher than what the USA (8.6 Litres) consumed. This can be authenticated by Gureje et al's 
(2007: 7) finding: ‘that alcohol is the most used drug in Nigeria’ and that ‘heavy episodic 
drinking, rather than moderate drinking is common among users of alcohol in Nigeria’. To 
date, there is no legal document in the form of policy in Nigeria to respond to increasing 
alcohol-related problems (Obot, 2007). This neglect has a long history according to 
Anumonye et al. (1977: 27):  
So far alcohol has not received the attention it deserves in Nigeria. It is increasingly abused. 
This abuse will become a serious problem within the next few years since: the prohibition on 
the formally illicit locally brewed gin has been lifted… beer breweries proliferated apparently 
for political purposes…. Local distilling of gin has recently received government blessing; 
bottling of imported spirits is very common now; the indigenous palm wine is gradually 
disappearing from the cities where more potent alcohol is being used.  
Successive Nigerian governments have continued to shun the regulation of harmful 
alcohol through policy as it has done in other sectors of the economy (Oluwaniyi, 2010). 
Globally, Nigeria is one of the 30 countries with highest per capita alcohol consumption and 
in Africa: Nigeria ranks second after Uganda due to myriad of reasons (WHO, 2004). One of 
the key reasons is because alcohol is the commonest drug consumed in the country due to 
unrestricted availability (Gureje et al., 2007). Uganda has begun to implement policies to 
control alcohol consumption, but in Nigeria alcohol consumption is increasing (Chikere and 
Mayowa, 2011) without a corresponding policy to control the harmful use. Yearly, many 
lives are lost through the road traffic accident linked to harmful alcohol use among drivers 
(Aworemi et al., 2010). In 2006, there were 4679 fatal accidents; in 2007, it rose to 8,477 
traffic accidents, with 17, 794 injuries and 4673 deaths with many unrecorded figures from 
unreported cases (Toroyan, 2009). There are also increasing violence and disorder in 
different communities and families, and many are coming from higher schools linked to 
harmful alcohol use (Rotimi, 2005; Brisibe et al., 2012; Adewuya, 2005).  
In a country with such significant alcohol-related problems, one might expect the 
formulation of appropriate policies by the government to reduce alcohol-related problems. 
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However, the reverse appears to be the case in Nigeria which is arguably due to the fact 
that ‘no single policy’ exists. This is arguably linked to the activities of the alcohol producers 
who have been supplanting policy initiatives by campaigning for responsible drinking, thus, 
creating ambiguities in the economy. Their weapons are highly influential campaigns for 
responsible drinking (Vanguard, 2011), advertising, promotions, sponsorship of sports and 
other social events, etc. (De Bruijn, 2011; Obot and Ibanga, 2002). Some of these marketing 
activities have existed for many years but have become more aggressive since the WHA and 
WHO began the move to reduce alcohol related harms through policies. It can be argued 
that the primary motives of these brewers are to market their products, increase profit and 
maintain a good image at the expense of the policy as they do in other countries 
(Giesbrecht, 2004). 
 Taking a point of departure from Eisenberg’s Strategic Ambiguity thesis, the locus of 
my argument in this article is that, in Nigeria, brewers have been employing strategic 
ambiguities to advance their mission of distracting the policy makers, health professionals 
and the populace from focusing on the reality of lack of policies to reduce the alcohol 
related harms, which their activities, are encouraging. The article is divided into four 
sections. The following part lays out the theoretical framework guiding the article, followed 
by the sections examining how brewers apply the model, arguably to achieve their purposes 
of hindering policy from being formulated and the conclusion. 
 
The Strategic Ambiguity Theory 
Eric Eisenberg, a communication expert was the first person to use the concept of Strategic 
Ambiguity (SA) in his seminal work- Ambiguity as Strategy in Organizational Communication 
(Eisenberg, 1984), where he posited that effective communication should not always be 
judged on openness or clarity of language because meaning is contextual. Therefore, 
‘people in organizations use ambiguity strategically to accomplish their goals’ (Eisenberg, 
1984: 228). Strategic Ambiguity, which is from the interactional communication paradigm is 
an organizational tool employed most times to achieve goals that clarity may not achieve 
(Eisenberg, 1984). Openness sometimes may be risky (Eisenberg and Witten 1987); 
therefore, organizations facing multiple goals can utilize ambiguous symbols or words to 
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achieve these multiple goals because ambiguity is a product of language (Eisenberg, 1998). 
Clarity and ambiguity are two sides of the same coin: both are functional imperatives and 
none is the end in itself. As clarity is a feature of messages, so is ambiguity, which is 
advanced, via a combination of the source, message and receiver factors (Atkin et al., 2008). 
Therefore, it is often advanced as an effective tool of communication because: ‘People in 
organizations confront multiple situational requirements, develop multiple and often 
conflicting goals, and respond with communicative strategies which do not always minimize 
ambiguity, but may nonetheless be effective’ (Eisenberg, 1984: 228). 
Eisenberg posited that, in organizing, clarity (openness) is an essential ingredient, but 
because organizations do not pursue unilateral goals, and are faced with tensions from 
within and without, manipulation of symbols to create ambiguity of communication 
becomes the best option in order to achieve these multiple goals even though he and other 
scholars acknowledged that this may not always be ethical. SA, therefore, is a purposeful, 
essential and effective means of communication. 
Meanings are contextual and relative and are constituted by individuals. They are not 
‘inherent in any discourse’ (Eisenberg, 1984: 229). For example, a word used in informal 
communication may not be understood the same way in a formal setting. This makes 
organizations to strategically select symbols loaded with ambiguities so as to achieve their 
goals, leaving individuals to decide based on their interpretations of the message. He said 
that SA is vital in an organization because it ‘promotes unified diversity’ (Eisenberg, 1984: 
230) and helps in promoting the growth of many viewpoints because it leaves those who 
receive the message with multiple interpretations. Strategic Ambiguity in a nutshell is the 
employment of implicit language (with vague meaning) purposefully to achieve goals 
through the creation of multiple meanings or interpretations. It is functional, it is essential 
for organizations in turbulent environments where clarity may be risky and it achieves what 
clarity may not (Eisenberg, 1984) in most cases.  
Several other scholars from diverse disciplines have employed this model to explore 
different studies. Ulmer and Sellnow (1997) posited that organizations use ambiguity to 
create a favourable image even though such activities may be considered to be unethical 
while Myers (1996) revealed that even in academic writing, ambiguity can sometimes be 
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purposefully employed. Alesina and Holden (2008) also showed how candidates in an 
electioneering campaign can employ SA to score points and appeal to voters. This is done by 
announcing multiple policies than just a single one, thus creating escape routes in case the 
successful candidate did not pursue all.  
Davenport and Leitch (2005) also revealed how SA applied to delegate authority in 
organizations while Riedel and Sass (2011) demonstrated how SA can be used in peace 
negotiation. In advertising, Pedersen (2002: 169) argues that advertisers create ‘ambiguity 
within advertisements to gain double profit with consumers’. Agostinelli and colleague 
applying this model revealed that brewer-sponsored message is often ineffective in reducing 
alcohol-related problems because it is mostly designed to improve the brewer’s image and 
sell their products (Agostinelli and Grube, 2002). Their findings further revealed that it 
permits ‘liberal alcohol consumption even in a risky situation’ (Agostinelli and Grube, 2002: 
18), and this is because the messages are loaded with ambiguities. Other scholars have 
applied the SA model in their research (Zwarun and Farrar, 2005; Ulph and Ulph, 2001; Bernheim 
and Whinston, 1998; Ako, 2003; Burbank, 2006) to examine different phenomena and this 
shows its efficacy. The next section will demonstrate the role of brewers in alcohol policy in 
Nigeria through the use of different SAs, as effective measures to manipulate Nigerian 
society and achieve their multiple goals. 
 
Strategic Ambiguity as a Tool for Brewers in Nigeria 
Strategic Ambiguity of ‘Drink Responsibly’ Campaign  
Globally, personal interest is known to engender or hinder policy formulation and 
implementation. This does not apply to alcohol policy alone, but includes other issues like 
wealth redistribution (Glennerster, 2012). In the area of alcohol policy, alcohol producers 
are known for hindering and rejecting a stringent regulatory policy that will control 
production and marketing due to economic interest (Miller et al., 2010). Some of their 
claims are that they, the producers, contribute to the economic growth (Room and Jernigan, 
2000), therefore, restriction will engender a low sale which is tantamount to job loss. 
Another part of their claims is that advertising does not automatically predict increased 
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drinking among children and adolescents as reported in Germany (Morgenstern et al., 
2011). They prefer to promote a responsible drinking message- a self-regulatory, social 
responsibility of the alcohol producers, known for its ineffectiveness (Bakke and Endal 
2010). In Nigeria, the case appears to be the same as the article will reveal.  
Following the call for the drafting of strategies to control harmful alcohol in 2005, 
the actual draft of a ten-point strategy in 2008 and the adoption of 2010 WHO’s resolution 
to implement policies, brewers in Nigeria adopted different SAs, in addition to their former 
tools, whose implicit aim, arguably, is to further distract policy makers from implementing 
alcohol policy. One of such is the intensified drink responsible campaign championed by 
Guinness Nigerian Plc., Nigerian breweries Plc. and International Centre for Alcohol Policies 
(ICAP). The campaign is mostly targeted at drivers by using posters to campaign in 
commercial motor parks and other public places (Vanguard, 2011).  
The brewers and the ICAP are collaborating with one of the government agencies 
(Federal Road Safety Commission FRSC) in this campaign where drivers are advised to ‘drink 
responsibly’ instead of adopting don’t drink if you will drive strategy which is the WHO’s 
option. Brewers and the ICAP have spent millions of Naira (Guinness Nigeria, 2011) on this 
campaign and the reason may be via SA, to persuade the government that they are helping 
out to curb alcohol problems in Nigeria. This interpretation of strategy is supported by a 
concurrent campaign being run by the same breweries which encourages people to buy a 
drink and collect tokens which can be used to claim prizes such as more alcohol, money and 
cars (De Bruijn, 2011).  The campaign does not recommend abstention for pregnant women 
or other vulnerable groups. 
On the other hand, it is arguably a social responsibility campaign, and instead of 
affecting the brewers negatively, it may help them to achieve multiple goals because it 
generates multiple views and that may increase organizational positive image (Atkin et al., 
2008) and higher sales. Behind the campaign for responsible drinking, lies the goal of 
silencing debate that may lead to policy to control harmful alcohol consumption stringently 
(Abramson in Atkin et al., 2008) or the initiation of policy that will not be effective (Holmila et 
al., 2011). The campaign is arguably aimed at frustrating the implementation of the number-
four strategy of the WHO 2010 resolution which is drink-driving policies and 
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countermeasures (Poznyak, 2010). This, in part, is because it was initiated in 2010 being the 
year the WHA adopted the resolution to implement policies in countries that hitherto did 
not have alcohol policies (Vanguard, 2011). The other reason is because the policy makers 
may see the self-regulatory campaign as reasonable and good enough to deter misuse of 
which further resources need not be wasted in pursuit of further policies, especially in such 
countries with limited resources. This subtly adds to enhance the image of the brewers and 
can influence brand preference (Smith et al., 2006; Gordon et al., 2010). The message has 
been proved to likely ‘create a positive image if the target audience perceives it as socially 
responsible’ (Smith et al., 2006: 1) due to ambiguity of meaning. It is also part of the 
strategies that have been discovered to be ineffective in other countries (Anderson et al., 
2009). 
In Nigeria, there is no definition of responsible drinking by the government or 
Ministry of Health because there is no definition of standard drinks. There are no legal 
frameworks (policy) mandating alcoholic beverages to carry alcohol by volume (ABV) on 
labels, and there is no effective framework to deter minors from purchasing and consuming 
this substance (Oshodin, 1995). If responsible drinking (in units, volume/standard drink) is 
not defined by the government, then what is the basis for measuring responsible drinking in 
the campaign of the ICAP and brewers? This is SA because to have irresponsible drinking, 
what constitute responsible drinking must have been defined. For there to be responsible 
drinking for such people like pregnant women, they must be drinking in reality. But other 
countries including the UK warn individuals in such group not to drink at all (Farke 2011). 
This means arguably that it is an SA of brand promotion rather than the encouragement of 
abstinence. 
There is also another fact not made obvious to Nigerian society and other 
populations: that the ICAP (who fronts this campaign and other targets of the advertisement 
campaigns) is an organization established and sponsored by global alcohol producers, 
including Guinness-Diageo the mother-company of the Guinness Nigeria to protect their 
interests (Casswell, 2008; McCreanor et al., 2002). This organization will never support 
stringent policy to regulate alcohol (Holmila et al., 2011) due to vested interest (Bakke and 
Endal, 2010). To show that such a marketing/image creation partnership is not to the 
benefit of the public, McCreanor et al. (2002: 183) posited that globally, ‘the benefits to 
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ICAP of partnership with the public have been made clear- respectability, credibility and the 
legitimation of ICAP’s representation of industry interests in policy arenas’.  This is the exact 
thing they have succeeded in doing in Nigeria. 
Additionally, due to different progressive legislation in Western European and North 
American countries that has made it difficult for makers of adverse health products such as 
alcohol, tobacco, etc. to maintain high profit, they target Africa and Asia in their 
determination to recoup the profit margins that they lose in their home markets (Jernigan 
and Obot, 2006). They redeploy to Africa and Asia where the presence of weak states 
presided by irresponsible actors who disregard responsiveness by allowing them a field day 
to bribe their way around and make stupendous profit from the blood of the population. 
Globally, alcohol industries use different SAs to achieve their aim of influencing 
policies that favour moderate drinking rather than abstention. In Australia, alcohol 
producers established Drinkwise with ‘$5 million’ (Miller et al., 2011: 1561) in 2005, in UK 
Drinkaware was formed by brewers while Alcohol 101 is in the USA (Piazza-Gardner and 
Barry, 2011). A very interesting position of these organizations sponsored by alcohol 
industries is that they often claim independence from the alcohol industry (Miller et al., 
2011) whilst accepting their financial support. Globally, their modus operandi is similar, and 
one of such is: the campaign for responsible drinking and their reports on alcohol findings 
are bedevilled by inconsistencies (Miller et al., 2011; Jernigan, 2012). These moderating 
organisations usually send reports for peer review before publishing, but then don’t change 
behaviour or culture in light of the comments from the peer reviewer which point to the 
initial weakness in the commissioning of their studies (Foxcroft, 2005). This is consistent 
with McCreanor et al's (2002: 181) assertion that:  
Between 1995 and 1998, ICAP produced five reports. They are a vehicle that allows 
ICAP to promote its own ideas on alcohol policy issues while downplaying research-
based public health strategies. The first report encouraged drinking pointing out the 
benefits of moderate drinking and downplayed binge drinking. 
In Nigeria, the role of the ICAP has not extended beyond prolonged seminars and campaigns 
that started in 2010. One thing that is not yet clear is why Guinness Diageo- the mother 
company of Guinness Nigeria waited until 2005 (the year the WHA raised alarm for policy to 
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curb harmful use of alcohol) before initiating a global information strategy (Vanguard, 2011) 
and the ICAP and other brewers waited until 2010 (the year the WHO’s resolution was 
adopted) to initiate and intensify their campaign for responsible drinking in Nigeria.  This is 
despite the fact that Nigerian Breweries and Guinness have been in Nigeria since 1946 and 
1962 respectively. It is likely that their recent campaigns were strategically managed to 
distract government attention from focusing on policies which are in line with the WHO’s 
2010 resolution. The campaign for responsible drinking by organizing seminars is also likely 
to delay call to action from the government or other stakeholders as Room (2005: 1803) 
comments:  
…ICAP, an industry funded public relations group, defines its task as changing the  
debate about alcohol’s place in the world by shifting the discussion from the 
commodity to behaviour, away from the traditional focus of policy discussion, which 
has been on the regulation of beverage alcohol.  
 
Since the brewers/ICAP’s campaign in collaboration with the FRSC began, the 
campaign has not ended to date, and no policy has been initiated. In fact, such partnership 
is what Hawks (2009) referred to as the lamb lying down with the lion. Just as, Eisenberg 
(1984) posited, organizations, that are facing tension or in a turbulent business environment 
use SA to achieve their goals, so brewers in Nigeria arguably are using the campaign for 
responsible drinking as a SA weapon to delay or entirely deter any move for a policy in 
Nigeria.  
 
Strategic Ambiguity of Advertisements 
Another aspect is the use of the SA by the brewers to advertise their products in Nigeria. For 
example, in the electronic media, the two-words, drink responsibly, is only briefly 
mentioned at the end of advertisement and is also placed inconspicuously on billboards. 
This arguably is SA to achieve multiple goals. Some of these goals are to create room for 
multiple interpretations among the public. Another goal may be to make the public to 
believe alcohol is good and thus increase sales. This is because ambiguous evidence such as 
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‘drink responsibly’ makes consumers confused easily in that it generates multiple 
interpretations (Atkin et al., 2008) leading to what Eisenberg (1998) called flirting with 
meaning.  
The producers and their marketers strategically situate principal cities with wide 
billboards portraying alcohol as good for health, success, joy, etc. (Obot and Ibanga, 2002) 
and inconspicuously place the two-words- drink responsibly at the bottom. They also print 
branded T-shirts as souvenirs and distribute them to the youths thus, making the youths 
walking billboards. This has implications because research has shown that it indirectly 
engages the youths in marketing and also makes other youths to endorse the brand seen on 
their peers’ clothing (Stoolmiller et al., 2012). This advertising in both government and 
private media generate money for the government through tax and levy. This arguably is a 
method used to circumvent government policies in Nigeria.  
 In a country with over 250 officially recognized languages and low literacy level, 
such ambiguous words like 'drink responsibly’ may remain ineffective. This is because, for 
the right decision to be made the decision maker needs to be properly informed. There are 
many Nigerians who do not understand English language. Therefore, this group may not be 
able to differentiate between responsible and irresponsible drink promotions, especially if 
safe drinking limits are not defined or specified by the government (due to lack of policy). 
This is another SA because no effort is made to translate responsible drinking into the local 
languages. As Eisenberg (1984) and Eisenberg and Witten (1987) posited, such clarity may 
be risky to the attainment of organizational multiple goals; the receivers are deliberately left 
with multiple interpretations and their actions will be based on how they interpret the 
message. One of such interpretations may be to regard the ‘drink responsibly’ as part of the 
overall advertisement because it does not come as a separate message (Agostinelli and 
Grube, 2002).  
Among those who even understand the English language, it may be misunderstood 
to mean drinking makes you responsible. This is because it often ends their electronic media 
adverts after glamorizing drinking and as it is said that you reserve the best for last, people 
may understand it as telling them to drink because drinking is responsible. The message 
does not appear as a separate anti-drinking warning nor does it appear in the form of public 
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service announcement like what obtains in some other countries (Agostinelli and Grube, 
2002),  and this is why it may not be efficacious. It is a pro-drinking campaign loaded with SA 
instead of an anti-drinking campaign which is most effective.  Research findings have shown 
that warning messages with symbols achieve better results than the text alone (Argo and 
Main, 2004). Interestingly, the symbolic representation of the dangers of alcohol 
consumption are entirely absent in Nigeria. This is a choice that the brewers who fund the 
campaigns make. In line with the WHO Global Status Report on non-communicable Disease 
2010, South Africa has proposed a total ban of alcohol advertisement (Parry et al., 2012) in 
order to check alcohol problems in that country. This is not same with the Nigerian 
government and their agencies. The latter is relying on self-regulation from alcohol 
producers.  
As said, the drink responsibly warning message has been criticised because of its 
ambiguity, ineffectiveness and for playing the role of public relation advisor for the brewers 
(Smith et al., 2006) rather than as an anti-drinking campaign. Like Smith and colleagues 
argued, most of the adverts they surveyed in the USA, portrayed drinking being glamorized 
without showing the negative consequences of alcohol consumption. In Nigerian, the same 
effect can be seen in alcohol adverts (Obot and Ibanga, 2002). Attractive young males and 
females are employed as models and marketers, and advert clips are glamorised extensively 
with the ‘drink responsibly’ tag hurriedly ending it. The fact cannot be denied that the 
brewers are in business to make a profit, but economic interest should not overrule public 
health interest. This is because harmful alcohol use has multiple implications both for the 
individual and society (Fisher et al., 2007; Klingemann and Gmel, 2001; Djamba and Kimuna, 
2008; Ayesu, 2011).  
 
Strategic Ambiguities of Job Creation, Poverty Alleviation and Social 
Responsibility 
One of the other parts of the use of the SA is the recent employment of local artistes to 
promote the brewers’ products and the social event as against the foreign artistes they were 
using in the 1990s to early 2000s (Nigerian Breweries, 2012; Obot and Ibanga, 2002). For 
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example, local musicians like Tuface Idibia, P-Square and many other popular musicians and 
footballers (who are mainly young and idolised) are employed to promote these social 
events (Nigerian Breweries, 2012). This is another SA because they might want to be seen as 
employers of labour or those who empower the youths as has been reported as one of their 
main strategies (Holmila at al., 2011). Therefore, those who have benefited from them may 
not want to initiate a move for a policy that may hinder their sources of wealth.  
To attract the youth more, these two main brewers now have many other new 
youths’ social events they sponsor. Some of these events are Star Trek, Star Quest, Star 
Game Show, Star Time to Shine, the Heineken Champions League Viewing Centre, Gulder 
Ultimate Search, Big Brother Africa, etc. (Nigerian Breweries, 2012; Guinness Nigeria, 2011). 
A unique feature of these events is that youthfulness is a criterion for registration and 
participation. The winners of some of these events go home with brand new cars, cash (in 
millions), and in most cases, a musical-record deal (Nigerian Breweries, 2012), and this is 
ambiguities of job creation and poverty alleviation. 
Other events they have sponsored include the National Essay Competition for 
secondary school students, fashion show, the beauty pageant and sporting events on 
campuses (Obot and Ibanga, 2002). Though, the sponsorship of events had been in 
existence but may have become more intense since 2010 as information on one of the 
leading brewers’ website pointed out: 
Our Corporate Social Responsibility is driven by a strategic vision to ‘win with Nigeria’… 
Some of the initiatives taken along these lines in 2010 including the following:… The National 
Reading Competition which the company has been sponsoring since 2004 continued in 2010 
as part of our youth empowerment programme… In 2010, one hundred and fifty million 
naira was approved to renovate and or donate classroom blocks… A school was provided 
with a borehole and generator… In 2010, we sustained our sponsorship of a public education 
and awareness programme to promote safety on our roads…In conclusion, Corporate Social 
Responsibility is a strategic element of our operations… (Nigerian Breweries, 2012). 
The Guinness Nigeria brewery has also sponsored National football team-Supper 
Eagles and the underlining intention in part may be to create an impression that Guinness is 
good for sports (De Bruijn, 2011). On the other hand, it may make the policy makers feel 
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they are supportive of sports development in Nigeria; therefore, why regulating the 
availability of their products? It has been revealed that such sponsorships encourage brand 
preference and drinking (O'Brien et al., 2011). Researches have shown that sponsorship and 
advertising encourage young people to drink (Gordon et al., 2010) and create readiness to 
initiate drinking among people between 12-14 years (Gordon et al., 2011).  
These events sponsored by brewers, are often held in different prominent cities, in 
Nigeria, and many are night events of which youths are admitted freely or with minimal 
payment (Nigerian Breweries, 2012). In these social events, young people, including those 
that are below 18 years attend. This is because, at present, Nigeria has no effective means 
of Identification due to the failed National Identity card Project during President Obasanjo’s 
regime.  For example, on May 25 2012, Nigerian Breweries, held the ‘Real Deal Nite’ at The 
NiteShift Coliseum located in Ikeja, Lagos to promote Legend Extra Stout and admission was 
totally free (Nigerian Breweries, 2012).   
These events receive wide coverage by the media including the government’s media, 
and some of them are staged in the government-owned arena such as the stadium and 
national theatre. The implication of this is that these producers are not just encouraging 
alcohol initiation, use and misuse, but are indirectly grooming future drinkers. This, in part, 
is because alcohol consumption is portrayed in a positive light and offered freely, thus 
creating the SA of seeing alcohol as always good. Another key implication is that the 
brewers use this measure to supplant government policy to restrict their activities because a 
huge sum of money is paid to government coffers as tax or levy for using government 
properties. So how can a government that receives levy make a policy that will reduce its 
revenue? Another salient point is that Nigerian Breweries and Guinness Nigeria own the 
third and thirteenth leading stocks in the Nigerian Stock market (Nigerian Breweries, 2012; 
Guinness Nigeria, 2011), and many top politicians in Nigeria own their stocks as 
shareholders. Therefore, policy to restrict the brewers’ activities will not just affect the 
brewers but the stock owners, and Nigeria being as corrupt as it is (Smith, 2010), leaders are 
self-centred (Agbiboa, 2012) and may never formulate anti-alcohol policy.  
Another part of the SA is that in these social events, different brands of their 
products are displayed strategically, and they use their senior staff to create a positive 
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image of alcohol consumption. This arguably is SA created to achieve multiple goals for the 
brewers in Nigeria. This is because the use of alcohol is strategically portrayed as a sine qua 
non for success, thus, creating further ambiguity among the youths. In one of the National 
(secondary school) Essay Competition Awards, the chief executive officer of Nigerian 
Breweries who was the ‘guest lecturer’ promised that his company will support the essay 
competition with one million naira (about 6360 US dollars) annually for a five-year term and 
stylishly drank the Gulder beer from his company in the presence of teenagers as he 
delivered his lecture (Obot and Ibanga, 2002). In fact, Ola cited in Obot and Ibanga (2002: 7) 
described the situation this way:  ‘without saying it…the children must have taken away the 
impression that Gulder is good for you when you attain success-just the way (he) sipped the 
larger as he delivered his lecture’.  
Another aspect of this SA lately is the regular promotions that encourage people to 
drink their products in order to win prizes such as electricity generating set, fridges, and 
even cars (Nigerian Breweries, 2012). The brewers ‘conceal some of these prizes under the 
crown cork and advise consumers to uncover it and win any prize they discover’ (De Bruijn, 
2011: 37). Their redemption centres distribute the prizes and whoever has the winning seal 
on the crown cork (minors inclusive) receives the prizes. Apart from these promotions, they 
have also introduced raffle draws for money and cars and winners are drawn from different 
geo-political regions in the country (Nigerian Breweries, 2012).  
   This has a serious implication because research has revealed that giving away 
branded paraphernalia encourages harmful consumption of alcohol among those who 
directly received sponsorship or promotional materials (O'Brien, Kypri 2008). This may be 
one of the reasons industry-produced beer has become the most preferred alcoholic drink 
in Nigeria (Odejide, 2006). Arguably, this is SA because it goes for poverty alleviation and 
economic empowerment of the masses. For example, someone who won a car or cash by 
just buying a bottle of beer may not want to join in any debate for anti-alcohol policy. This is 
succeeding in Nigeria where the government encourages liberal trade policy.  
The influence of these adverts, promotions, sponsorship of special events and other 
marketing strategies loaded with ambiguities have received little research attention in 
Nigeria. The only available data from the study conducted by the WHO Regional Office for 
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Africa, revealed that alcohol advertisement and promotion are on the increase and that 
they have alarming influence on young people in Nigeria (Bruijn, 2011). In that study, a 14-
year old boy revealed that: ‘if I don’t see the stout ad on television, I feel bad’ (De Bruijn, 
2011: 37) and added that he will like to drink stout because he admires the advert he sees.  
In the same vein, another 14-year old girl indicated that she likes Star (a product from 
Nigerian Breweries) advertisement more than other adverts, ‘because you can win so many 
things, for example, free drinks’ (De Bruijn, 2011: 37). This lends credence to the fact that 
alcohol advertisement affects youths’ drinking behaviour (Saffer, 2002; Martin et al., 2002) 
and social benefits of drinking portrayed in adverts encourage young people to drink 
(Zwarun and Farrar, 2005). 
 
Conclusion   
The article has analysed the role of alcohol producers and their collaborator (ICAP) in aiding 
non-formulation and implementation of alcohol policies in Nigeria through SA. Just as, 
Eisenberg (1984) posited that organizations employ SA which is the use of unclear symbols, 
words and actions to achieve multiple goals, brewers in Nigeria use the SA of ‘responsible 
drinking’ campaign, adverts, promotion, sponsorship of events and ‘strategic social 
responsibilities’, especially since 2010 to hinder policy initiatives.  
Though the paucity of published data on this debate may be evident in Nigeria, but 
myriad of evidence from the brewers’ websites and others provided by renowned substance 
researchers outside Nigeria corroborate the fact that brewers often employ SA to either 
hinder policy initiatives or encourage ineffective policies globally. For example, in the New 
Zealand, McCreanor et al. (2002: 179) argued that: ‘alcohol producers engage in a campaign 
to capture the hearts and minds of alcohol researchers and public health people, as part of a 
major effort to win the war of ideas that shape alcohol policy at national and international 
level’.  
This is in keeping with what Jernigan (2012: 80) revealed about the ICAP in the USA, 
reporting that ‘their strategies include producing scholarly publications with incomplete, 
distorted views of the science underlying alcohol policies; pressuring national and 
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international governmental institutions; and encouraging collaboration of public health 
researchers with alcohol industry-funded organisations and researchers’. Because their 
campaign for responsible drinking is pro-drinking and detrimental to the public good, 
Anderson (2009: 256) in Europe concluded that ‘…alcohol industry should not be involved in 
educational programmes, because such involvement could actually lead to an increase in 
harm’. Another proof is their activities in sponsorship of education or conferences globally. 
For example, in the annual ‘Conference of the State Liquor Administration held between 20-
24 June 2010 in the USA, 72.2% of the 187 conference attendees were from alcohol 
producers, importers, wholesalers, retailers, or their attorneys’ (Mart, 2012: 259). Mart 
went on to show that 65% of the panellist came from ‘alcohol industry’ and he ‘was the only 
attendee, and the only panellist, representing public health policy’ (Mart, 2012: 259). 
Though this conference may not have taken place in Nigeria, but what can one expect to be 
the Communique of such a conference? 
Therefore, to remedy the situation in Nigeria, it is expedient for the government to 
formulate and implement policies adopting the ten-point policy thrusts of the WHO’s 
resolution ‘strategies to reduce the harmful use of alcohol’ (WHO, 2009; Poznyak, 2010) in 
Nigeria. Policy makers should reconsider their economic interests and rise to the global call 
for action against the rising menace of alcohol misuse and alcohol-related problems of 
which Nigeria is one of the leading contributors (Dumbili, 2013). There is a need to define 
what standard drink is, specify ABV for all the alcoholic beverages and mandate labels to 
carry it. The policy should encourage ‘pictorial warnings’ on the labels of cans and bottles. 
This will help non-literate consumers to understand what is being communicated. This in 
part is because noticeable pictorials and changing messages at intervals have resulted in 
behavioural change in Europe and the USA (Argo and Main, 2004; Hammond et al., 2004; 
Borland et al., 2009). On the other hand, vague information (such as ‘drink responsibly’) has 
been reported to hider safe drinking in the UK (Ritchie et al., 2009) and should be 
discouraged in Nigeria. Ban should be placed on advertising that portrays alcohol 
consumption as the only sources of vitality and pleasure. Sponsorships of special events by 
alcohol producers should also be discouraged. There is also need to ban night events these 
brewers sponsor because it is a strategic use of ambiguity, and initiate reorientation of the 
youths to change their wrong beliefs on alcohol-related benefits such as drinking to win 
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prizes. In sum, if policy formulation keeps being neglected, alcohol-related problems may 
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